The final Verian poll (conducted 28th June - 1st July) correctly forecast the outcome of the election and has been independently assessed by academics working in the field as the single most accurate poll. This was largely due to the quality of the sample, sourced from our own social research panel Public Voice.
This panel is one of very few in the UK that is based on a controlled, random sample of the population. Inferences drawn from Public Voice surveys have stronger claims of validity than inferences drawn from the kinds of stratified convenience sample used by most pollsters.
Source: Professor Will Jennings, https://x.com/drjennings/status/1809719404042809483
A review of the 2024 election
How have voting intentions changed since the 2019 General Election?
Using our final pre-election poll, we can visualise how support shifted between 2019 and 2024. As with other recent general elections, this election was characterised by a high level of volatility: many voters chose a different party in 2024 than in 2019.
Labour's vote share in 2024 was built mainly from 2019 Labour voters (c.55% of support) but about 20% of its support came from people who did not vote in 2019, and c.10% of its support came from each of the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats.
There was also a general dispersal of the 2019 Conservative vote across multiple parties in 2024. In particular, two thirds of Reform UK voters voted Conservative in 2019.
While Labour attracted more 'new' voters than any other party in 2024, it also lost voters from the Corbyn era: for example, two in five Green voters voted Labour in 2019.
How widespread was tactical voting in the 2024 election?
Part of the reason for party choice volatility was widespread tactical voting. This was fuelled by the wide dissemination by the media and campaigners of projections for specific constituencies, often based on modelled polling estimates (MRP).
In 2024, the tactical voting was largely anti-Conservative, primarily benefiting the Liberal Democrats and the Labour party. In England, each of these parties gained votes where they were perceived to be main challengers to the Conservatives, but lost votes elsewhere. Consequently, both gained a relatively enormous number of seats while barely increasing their national vote shares.
The evidence suggests that Reform UK voters did not vote tactically at this election. Many of these voters helped Labour – a less favoured party for most Reform supporters – win additional seats.
How did voting intention change by age?
Party choice varied substantially by age. Labour was the most popular choice of all age groups up to age 65, and overwhelmingly so among under 50s.
The Conservatives were the most popular party among those aged 65+ but had support from under 10% of those in their 20s and early 30s.
Labour’s strong support among younger people (aged <45) was tied to perceptions of both the national and personal economy. Younger people reported greater struggles with their personal budget than was the case among older people and were also more likely to be pessimistic about the national economy (the two of course related). The status quo held little attraction for them. For older voters, these money struggles were less pronounced.
The rise of Reform UK
Support for Reform UK slowly increased over the last two years, with a substantial rise following the announcement that Farage would stand in Clacton and lead the party.
Around one-in-six voters stated that immigration was the most important factor in deciding who to vote for in 2024 but this was dwarfed by the number citing the economy or the state of the NHS. However, among those who said immigration was the most important factor in deciding who to vote for, half voted for Reform UK and a third for the Conservative party.
The relative lack of salience of immigration across the broader electorate is likely to have constrained Reform UK’s vote share in 2024.
Looking ahead to the next UK General Election
What could the 2024 election results indicate for the next election?
Scotland
In Scotland, the reduction in the SNP’s Westminster presence could, by the next election, be perceived to have limited the Scottish ‘voice’ in parliament. If this happens even marginally, Labour could find itself narrowly losing 10-20 seats in the Central Belt.
Liberal Democrats
The Liberal Democrats won 72 seats in 2024: in 64 of these constituencies the Conservative party came second.
There is no point in Labour targeting Liberal Democrat voters in the next general election as there would need to be a substantial Liberal Democrat to Labour swing (e.g. 3 percentage points or more) before this would yield many additional seats. In fact, a decline for the Liberal Democrats would generally favour the nationalist parties and the Conservatives as much, if not more so, than Labour.
There is a risk for both Labour and the Liberal Democrats themselves that those in Southern England who switched from Conservative to Liberal Democrat in 2024 switch back once the Conservatives are out of government and under new leadership. However, this is only likely if the Conservatives tack closer to the centre ground of British politics. Any kind of alliance with Reform or absorption of prominent Reform politicians is likely to prevent this happening.
The Liberal Democrats have a strong record of keeping the seats they win. This may mean that they end up losing relatively few seats at the next election even if there is a less hospitable (than 2024) national environment for them.
Green
An increase in the Green party vote share at the next election would likely be damaging for the Labour party. A proportional 3.5%pt swing from Labour to the Greens – all else being equal relative to the 2024 election - could lead to a loss of 35-40 seats, though few of these to the Greens themselves.
Conversely, attracting Green 2024 voters to the Labour party could strengthen the party position slightly. A proportional 1%pt swing from Green to Labour could lead to an additional 5-10 seats for Labour.
Reform UK
Some of those who voted Reform in 2024 may choose to vote more tactically next time, perhaps for the Conservative party if its new leader is aligned with Reform voters on the latter’s key concern of immigration policy and delivery. This could happen even without any formal alliance between the Conservatives and the Reform leaders.
A proportional c.3.5%pt swing from Reform UK to the Conservatives – all else being equal - could lead to the Conservatives gaining c.50 seats.
Reform UK has recently announced that they are aiming to win support from Labour voters. However, the average Reform UK 2024 voter holds very different political views to the average Labour 2024 voter. This suggests that Reform UK would find it difficult to attract a large proportion of Labour voters unless immigration becomes a more salient issue for voters in general, allowing linkage between groups that otherwise seem incompatible.
Reform UK and Conservatives
We think the probability of a merger or even just a formal alliance between the Conservatives and Reform UK is low. Conservative 2024 MPs appear to be no more right-wing than those elected in 2019[1]. However, much will depend on who is next party leader and how the political situation evolves over the next 5 years.
Consolidation of the right-wing vote could potentially have a large impact:
- If we naively combine vote shares for Conservatives and Reform UK in all GB constituencies, Labour would have won 269 seats in 2024, and “Conservatives + Reform” would have won 298 seats (ahead but insufficient for a majority).
In reality, some 2024 Conservative voters would not vote for this party as their values do not align with Reform UK or the Conservative right. For example:
- A quarter of Conservative voters voted Remain in the 2016 referendum.
- A fifth of Conservative voters disagree that there are too many immigrants in this country.
If we assume that all Reform UK 2024 voters and three quarters of 2024 Conservative voters would vote for a combined party (with the remaining quarter opting not to vote rather than vote for another party), Labour would still have been the largest party and close to a majority in 2024.
Should the right align in this way, Labour would benefit from converting Green and/or Liberal Democrat 2024 voters in Labour / Conservative / Reform battlegrounds since these voters would be concerned about a strongly right-wing government.
Under this scenario, Labour would likely have a majority by winning 20%+ of 2024 Green voters or by winning 5%+ of 2024 Lib Dem voters so long as the flow of voters between Labour and other parties had an approximately net zero effect.
[1] Tom Calver analysis for The Times: https://x.com/TomHCalver/status/1810611277582270801
What if immigration becomes a more salient issue in 2029?
Immigration was of relatively low salience in 2024, with Verian public opinion polling showing that the economy and the NHS were much more important considerations when deciding who to vote for.
However, the salience of migration can shift relatively quickly. Ahead of the Brexit referendum in 2016, immigration was a top concern but has decreased considerably since then, despite net immigration into the UK increasing. However, immigration has become a much more salient issue in other Western European countries and that may end up affecting perceptions in the UK.
Should immigration become more salient in 2029, it is likely that some Labour voters (particularly in Brexit voting constituencies in the North of England) would shift their support towards Reform UK and/or the Conservative party.
- One-in-five Labour 2024 voters are already of the opinion that there should be fewer immigrants in this country.
- A quarter of Labour voters voted for Leave in the Brexit referendum.
This issue has the potential to affect the next election. Had one-in-five Labour 2024 voters switched (proportionately within each constituency) to the Conservatives and Reform UK (in equal numbers to each party): Labour would likely have been the largest party but short of a majority.
However, a degree of co-operation with the Liberal Democrats and Greens could help Labour in this scenario – e.g. parties standing down candidates in areas where they are unlikely to win or otherwise not promoting them (as happened in 2024 in an effort to beat the Conservatives).
Related insights
03 Oct 2024
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